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THE BAIL SYSTEM: IS IT ACCEPTABLE?
Society today is concerned about poverty. All branches of the
Federal government are directing their efforts toward the alleviation
of the burden of this economic disease. Congress and the Executive
have declared war on poverty-pursuing it with varying degrees of
vigor. For perhaps a longer time, the judiciary has been following a
parallel path. In Griffin v. Illinois' the Supreme Court expressed its
concern for the protection of the indigent defendant within our
criminal judicial system, and the Court has continued its concern.2
In Griffin the statutes involved were fair on their face and admin-
istered without apparent discrimination, yet the Supreme Court
held the procedure to be unreasonably discriminatory because it led
to differing results dependant upon the economic status of defen-
dants. Justice Black said that "[t]here can be no equal justice where
the kind of a trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has."3 The Court seemingly relied on both the due process and
equal protection clauses in creating a new standard of constitution-
ally permissible conduct for the states. Today the effects of state
action and inaction on different economic strata must be considered
in constitutional terms-not because of a legislative or executive war
on poverty but because of the Court's new standard for constitution-
ally acceptable behavior. This article will concern an area of state
action within the criminal system in terms of its constitutional valid-
ity as it affects various economic levels-the present bail practice. It is
constitutionally suspect for it produces different results depending
on the economic status of the defendant. The operation of the bail
system is affected by the financial position of the defendant, with
those defendants in the throes of poverty faring worst.
With the exception of limited reforms, the bail system in the
United States operates with great reliance being placed on the com-
mercial bondsman.4 His unique role is one of providing the pos-
1 351 US. 12 (1956) (indigent's right to transcript necessary for appeal on non-
constitutional errors in state court where appeal a matter of right).
2 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent's right to counsel on first
appeal in state court where appeal is granted as a matter of right); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent's right to counsel in all state felony cases);
Smith v. Bennett, 365 US. 708 (1961) (financial impediments may not condition the
availability of the writ of habeas corpus); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (non.
payment of a docket fee may not preclude criminal appeal).
3 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US. 12, 19 (1956).
4 D. J. FREma & P. M. IvA, BAIL iN THE UNTm E rATEs: 1964 at 22 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as BAn. IN U.S.].
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sibility of freedom from detention pending trial or appeal to the
defendant who cannot raise the total cost of bond through his own
financial resources. This possibility may be realized at costs which
vary widely throughout the nation. The defendant must pay a pre-
mium based on a percentage of the amount of the bail bond in addi-
tion to a service charge. Premiums are often paid through an
installment method, with the bondsman pledging to the court a
bond equal to the total amount of the bail. This obtains the defen-
'dant's release with the prospect that if the bondsman fails to produce
the bailee on the appointed date, the bond will be forfeited. The
court is relying on the profit motives of a bondsman to assure the
defendant's presence at trial. If the defendant appears, the bonds-
man is relieved of his liability, but the defendant has purchased his
freedom for the unrefundable price (premium plus service charge)
of the bondsman's services. Of course, in many instances an indigent
cannot afford the premium; with little hope of payment from the
indigent, the bondsman will often refuse to post the necessary bond
and the indigent remains in jail. This is so frequent an occurrence6
'it deserves serious attention.
A. History
Bail developed in medieval England as a means of giving
freedom to persons accused of a crime between apprehension and
the long-delayed trials which were so prevalent in that day.0 The
necessity for having some method of assuring the presence of the
defendant at trial was a result of the relative insecurity of the
medieval jails. It was considered better to release a defendant with
some assurance of his return rather than have the defendant obtain
his freedom through escape. 7 The sheriffs seemed to enjoy a discre-
tionary power to detain or release those who were arrested; 8 release
5 See Silverstein, Bail in State Courts: A Field Study and Report, 50 MINN. L.
REv. 621 (1966); Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106
U. PA. L REv. 693 (1958); Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration
of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1954). It has been determined from
one study that bail produces the largest disparity from an economic viewpoint among
presentencing stages. A 52 percentage point difference was found between the per-
centage of indigents and non-indigents released on bail in assault cases. Nagel, Dis.
parities in Criminal Procedure, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1272 1279 (1967).
6 On the history of bail, see generally Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Re-
examined, 70 YAmE L.J. 966 (1961); Longsdorf, Is Bail a Rich Man's Privilege?, 7
F.R.D. 309 (1948).
7 II F. POLLACK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 584 (2d ed. 1899).
8 Id.
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was normally into the custody of a friend or relative who was then
considered to be the defendant's jailer and surety. Referred to as
mainprise, this procedure required the sureties to produce the ac-
cused for trial or suffer imprisonment themselves. In some cases the
sheriff would accept a sum of money in place of surrender of the
surety. The system of personal surety continues in England today;'
but the English Bill of Rights 0 prohibits excessive bail in a manner
similar to the eighth amendment of our Constitution. There has
been a general tendency in England to admit all but the most serious
offenders to bail on the least restrictive terms, often personal recog-
nizance."
In the United States the constitutional guarantee of the right to
seek a writ of habeas corpus 2 and the prohibition against excessive
bail'3 expressed the colonial philosophy of respect for personal lib-
erty. Two years before the Bill of Rights was ratified, the Judiciary
Act of 1789 established a right to bail in the federal system for all
but capital cases.' 4 The constitutions of most states have guaranteed
this right in the state courts.15 Instead of the personal surety method,
monetary bond developed in the United States as the means of assur-
ing the presence of the defendant at trial. As a result, the bondsman
became a commercial companion to the judicial function of bail
determination. With mainprise, economic status was only of secon-
dary importance, but in America economic incentives are presently
the primary means of assurance. The result is a system in which the
attainment of release through bail is impossible for many defendants
because of their inability to post personally the required bond or to
secure the services of a bondsman.
B. Theory of Bail
The primary function of bail is to assure the presence of the
defendant at trial while giving him his liberty before the often long-
9 Magistrates' Courts Act, 15 & 16 Gco. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 7 at 1215 (1952).
i0 1 W & M. 2, c. 2 (1688).
11 D. KARLEN, ANGLO-AIERUCAN CRsNm.A.L JusncE 138 (1967).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 2.
13 US. CONST. amend. VIII.
14 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73.
15 E.g., OHIO CONsr. art. 1, § 9: "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except for capital offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption
great." This guarantee appears in the constitutions of 36 States. Comment, Deter-
mination of Accused's Right To Bail In Capital Cases, 7 Vm.. L. R v. 438, 450 (1962).
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delayed decision on his guilt or innocence.16 As late as the 19th
century, bail was looked upon as "being nothing more than a secu-
rity for the appearance of an offender."'17 The idea of bail before
trial can be explained as a corollary to the presumption of innocence
of those accused of a crime. 8 Bail relieves the accused (if he is able
to obtain bond for the amount set) of the experience of having to
remain in jail until trial19 which in many instances might be for
protracted periods.20 It relieves the state of the costs and burdens
of maintaining facilities to hold all defendants and at the same
time permits the court to retain a form of custody over the de-
fendant.21 While there may be a risk that the accused will take
flight even when released on bail, pre-trial detention cannot be
condoned.2  Society may be alarmed by the release of a particular
defendant due to the gravity of the crime committed, but the greater
danger of compromising our fundamental concepts of liberty and
innocence caution us to remember the function of bail.28
C. Theory in Practice
It is disturbing to discover the extreme dichotomy between the
legal rules designed to effectuate these policies and the working
effect of such rules. Critics of the present system of bail focus on the
gap between the goals sought and the actual results. This incon-
16 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); In re Lonardo, 86 Ohio App. 289, 291, 89
N.E.2d 502, 503 (1949).
17 A. HIGHMoRE, A DIGEST OF THE DocaRINE OF BAIL; IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CASES 192 (1791).
18 Quattrocchi v. Langlois, 219 A.2d 570, 573 (R.I. 1966).
19 This article will be directed toward the question of bail before trial. After
conviction there is a lack of the presumption of innocence; thus the courts find it
much easier to deny bail pending appeal. As one court has said, "the matter of bail
in these cases [appeals] is not a matter of strict legal right, but of legal favor, to be
granted or denied, as justice, both to the defendant and to society, may demand."
Sioux Falls v. Marshall, 48 S.D. 378, 391, 204 N.W. 999, 1005 (1925).
20 In 1963 the median time defendants not released on bail remained in jail was
96 days. McCarthy & Wahl, The District of Columbia Bail Project: An Illustration of
Experimentation and a Brief for a Change, 53 GEo. L.J. 675, 691 (1965).
21 State v. Olson, 152 N.W.2d 176, 177-78 (S.C. 1967).
22 With the exception of state provisions relating to capital crimes, present law
does not authorize pre-trial detention for any purpose except to protect against flight.
But if preventive detention were the goal for the bail system, a manipulation of the
bail system would not be the proper method to achieve it, for preventive detention
through high bail would fail whenever the defendant had financial resources sufficient
to post bond. Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1966).
23 Stack v. Boyle, 342 US. 1, 8 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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sistency led one writer to say that, in the current civil rights cases,
if the observer did not know better he might conclude that "the
purposes of bail are harassment, punishment, deterrence, imprison-
ment before trial and the imposition of unnecessary expenses on
civil rights organizations." 24 Such an observation does not seem
inaccurate after a review is made of the findings of the Philadelphia
Bail Study. In that study a survey of local magistrates revealed they
set high bail with the goals of deterrence, punishment and, astonish-
ingly enough, rehabilitation.25 One of the clearest admissions by a
member of the bench that the bail system is misused and results in
the detention of those whose liberty might otherwise be preserved
was that of a New York county judge who said, "[Q]uite candidly,
I think many of us judges do hold people to teach them lessons, even
though we know that they are supposed to be held only to secure
their return." 26
It is not surprising then to find from other recent studies that
among the larger city-counties only forty-seven percent of the defen-
dants were released on bail. Chicago released a low of twenty-five
percent while Philadelphia freed a high of eighty-six percent.r Does
this mean that the defendants in Chicago were three times as likely
to flee as those in Philadelphia? Probably not. The results can be
explained by the use of bail schedules which differ greatly between
localities. For a particular offense bail is arbitrarily set on the
schedule at a figure which the court feels will insure against flight
without consideration being given to the circumstances of the in-
dividual defendant. Experience has shown that the amount required
to assure the presence of the defendant is much less than is often
demanded. The Philadelphia and Chicago statistics reflect the
24 Wizner, Bail and Civil Rights, 2 LAw IN TRAN rION Q. 111 (1955).
25 Some magistrates candidly admitted that they set high bail to "break"
crime waves, keep the defendant in jail, cut him off from his narcotic supply,
protect women, "make an example" of a particular abusive defendant, make
him "serve some" time even where acquittal was a certainty, or protect
arresting officers from false arrest suits.
BAIL. N U.S., supra note 4, at 11.
26 BAIL AND SUMMiONS: 1965 PROCEE-INGS OF TIE INSTITUTM ON TiE OPERATION OF
PRETRIAL. R.aAs PRoJEcrs 118 (1966) [hereinafter cited as BAIL & Sumio.Ns: 1965].
Recently a federal court said in dictum that a State court might deny bail where it
appeared necessary to prevent a threat or likelihood of interference with the process
of investigation. Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 712 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
965 (1964).
27 Silverstein, Bail in State Courts-A Field Study and Report, 50 MINN. L. REv.
621, 624 (1966).
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various amounts considered necessary. In Philadelphia only one per-
cent of the defendants had bail set at more than $5,000, while in
Chicago bail was more than $5,000 for seventy-seven percent of the
defendants. 28
The studies just referred to point out that the blatant disregard
for the spirit of bail results in bail servings as an assurance of deten-
tion rather than assuring predisposition freedom from all bailable
accused persons. The burden of an improperly functioning system of
bail based on monetary considerations is carried most heavily by
the indigent who cannot afford to post any amount of bail or pay
the bondsman's premium and consequently languishes in jail. For the
destitute bail is impossible to make and represents an illusory alter-
native to detention. For the indigent bail is a real alternative only if
the bondsman determines that the accused is a good risk.
The wealthy individual can secure his freedom (in most cases)
without regard to the amount of bail that the court has set, but for
the poor the professional bondsmen "hold the keys to the jail in
their pockets.' 29 Does this treatment come within the broad language
of Justice Black in Griffin when he warned that "our own constitu-
tional guarantees of due process and equal protection both call for
procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discrimina-
tions between persons and different groups of persons?"8' 0 Before
this can be answered, however, other issues must be considered.
D. The Burdens Imposed
Unlike the establishment of the right to court-appointed coun-
sel and free transcripts, both reforms that have cost society a great
deal of money, a reform of the present system of bail would result
in a sizable saving for society. Indeed, in a period in which demands
are made for more police at higher salaries, the present system of pre-
trial detention drains the police force of manpower and finances as it
concurrently produces higher unemployment rates and swollen wel-
fare rolls. In St. Louis, for example, a city in which seventy-nine per-
cent of the defendants cannot raise bail, the community must bear
28 Id. at 625. While high bail is the major reason a defendant may not be able
to obtain his pre-trial freedom, it is not the sole reason. A defendant might also be
charged with several petty offenses with separate bail required for each offense, or he
may be charged with a non-bailable offense. Wizner, supra note 24, at 117.
29 Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, j., con.
curring).
80 Griffin v Illinois, 851 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
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the cost of two dollars and fifty-six cents per day for an average period
of six weeks for each defendant remaining in jail.3' In New York
Gity the cost per day reaches six dollars and tventy-five cents-a
total of 10 million dollars per year.32 When it is considered that
thirty to forty percent of the total prison population in the District
of Columbia were untried defendants who could not make bail,3 3
it is dear to even the casual observer that pre-trial detention is an
extremely costly burden in terms of the dollar outlay for prison
accommodations.
The monetary burden is not the only one which the community
must bear as a result of the incarceration of an accused. In most
instances it will be the poor who will be unable to make bail. Be-
cause the members of this group are often hourly wage earners, their
income and perhaps their jobs will be lost while in jail. If such
defendants have families a community burden of providing income
maintenance through welfare payments is created. If the defendants
are in jail, they are also probably being deprived of their only means
of securing funds to hire counsel. Therefore, the state will often
have to appoint counsel and provide free transcripts on appeal. If the
defendants were productive before arrest the community is also de-
prived of revenue it might othervise have obtained. The defendants
who cannot make bail, and often their families, become parasitic to
the community. The realization of the existence of all of these costs
to society is not of recent origin,3 4 but a meaningful consideration of
their total impact on the efficacy of the present bail procedure has
been seriously neglected.
What are the effects on the accused? Unlike the costs to the
community, the personal loss which a detained defendant experi-
ences is covert and difficult to measure. The jailing of an accused will
probably cause the loss of his job, the disruption of his family ties,
and the exhaustion of his assets. Furthermore, he will be labeled a
criminal by society for having spent time in jail. This prejudice to
the defendant in his social relationships may in turn prejudice him
at trial. Because of the importance of family ties and regular em-
ployment, the court may feel that this defendant's prospects for
31 BAIL IN U.S., supra note 4, at 42.
32 Id. at 41-42.
33 Id. at 16-17.
34 II F. POLLACK & F. M rwA, supra note 7, at 584.
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rehabilitation through probation have been lessened. There is em-
pirical evidence which supports this apprehension. 85 Studies have
shown that if two men are convicted of the same crime and are
sentenced by the same judge, the defendant who could not make bail
before trial will generally receive a harsher sentence, usually in-
cluding imprisonment. 6 This was found true even though prior
record, bail amount, type of counsel, family integration and employ-
ment stability were held constant.87 The result is a form of predis-
position punishment in which the determination of who is given
pre-trial freedom is arbitrary. Prejudice may also arise from the fact
that the defendant cannot aid in the preparation of his defense as
effectively as the defendant who is released; nor can he identify or
interview witnesses who might support his defense. In neighbor-
hoods with a high percentage of transients, the personal contacts of
the defendant may be essential due to the distrust of the residents.
Without this personal contact, the unbailed accused's defense suf-
fers.38 With an adversary system that has been protected with a right
to counsel at trial and on appeal, it is perhaps more important to
see that the accused be given the opportunity to "[search] for evi-
dence and witnesses, and [prepare] a defense"3 9 than to provide
assistance of counsel. Not only is the accused's defense not as effec-
tive, but with the prospect of prolonged imprisonment before trial,
the imprisoned defendant is often coerced by the desire for free-
dom to plead guilty or waive a jury trial. He knows that he may
experience many weeks in jail even if he is ultimately acquitted, but
waiver or a plea of guilty free him almost immediately through
35 Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 641 (1964); Ares,
Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-
trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 67 (1963).
36 Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on
the Use of Pre-trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. R . 67, 84-86 (1963); M. L. FRiEDLAND, DE-
TENMcoN BaroRE TRtAL 110-25 (1965). Interestingly, this thesis was considered and
rejected in Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 287, 149 N.W. 2d 557, 560 (1967).
37 The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 641, 655 (1964). 27% of 358
jailed defendants were not convicted. Id. at 642.
38 Whittington v. Gaither, 272 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Tex. 1967). In this case, an
indigent defendant in a robbery prosecution could not make bond and with no state
procedure for personal recognizance he could not go to Mississippi to interview a
witness needed for his alibi nor could he pay the witness fee required by the state;
the court held this to be a deprivation of due process and sixth amendment right to
counsel.
s9 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) (Jackson, J. concurring).
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probation. 0 Thus, although there is the popularly accepted philos-
ophy in America that there is a presumption of innocence until
proven guilty, the defendant without means to post bail experiences
immediate imprisonment, societal prejudice before conviction and
possible prejudice at trial. Even more disturbingly, this occurs in
a system in which up to sixty percent of the convicted defendants
are being released on probation without jail sentences.l
E. Alternatives to the Present System
In recognition of these problems, there has been widespread
research and study directed toward finding methods of alleviating
some, if not all, of the defects of the present system. A series of
studies dating as far back as 1927 has finally led to the creation of
reform projects.42 Following the pattern of the successful Manhattan
Bail Project,43 similar projects were undertaken in other localities.
Information has been the key to making these projects successful;
personal data is obtained through interviews with the accused fol-
lowed by telephone verification of four factors: (1) residential stabil-
ity; (2) family contacts in the area; (3) employment history, and (4)
prior criminal record." Such information permits individual con-
sideration of pre-trial release by the courts. It is evident that these
projects are efficacious when the results of sixty such projects are
considered. Judge Botein has remarked that of twenty-five thousand
defendants released on recognizance at the state and local level, only
1.6 percent of them wilfully failed to appear.45 Similar results were
obtained with the Michigan district court project, which released
seventy-one percent of all defendants on their own recognizance,
40 Pye, The Administration of Criminal Justice, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 286, 293 (1966)
BAmS iN US., supra note 4, at 16; cf. Dillehay v. White, 264 F. Supp. 164, 167 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966).
41 BAI. & SUMM~xoNs: 1965, supra note 26, at 58.
42 A. BErEY, TBE BAL S.Ysrm iN CH cAGo (1927). One of the first projects was
begun in the 1940's by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, using release on personal recognizance (RLOR) rather than depending on
monetary bail. Smith, A New Approach to the Bail Practice, 29 Fkr. PaoB4 M ON 3-4
(1965).
43 See generally Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim
Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. R-,. 67, 71 (1963).
44 BAn. 3n U.S., supra note 4, at 57-62; Thomas, BAS. IN Cw.umN CA.S, 15 WIs.
Rrs. L. Ray. 435, 458 (1964). For a copy of a sample information form, see Workshop:
Establishing Bail Projects, 1965 I". L.F. 42, 50-56.
45 BAIL & SUMM Ns: 1965, supra note 26, at 15.
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and ninety-nine percent of them returned for trial.40 This figure
compares favorably with those for defendants released after posting
a monetary bond, who had forfeiture rates within the same federal
jurisdiction of about three quarters of one percent.47 No longer does
the use of ROR have to be widely restricted by the courts, for "if
carefully screened defendants are released pending trial on their
own recognizance and treated with dignity; they will appear at
trial."48
Illinois has approached the problem by concentrating on re-
form within the monetary bail system. For all bailable offenses in
Illinois, the accused can obtain release by executing a bond in an
amount equal to the bail set and by depositing with the court ten
percent of that amount but in no event less than $25. The defendant
receives a refund of ninety percent of his deposit if he appears in
court at the appointed time.49 It is felt that friends or relatives will
probably be willing to help an accused secure the ten percent de-
posit knowing they have a reasonable expectation of having most
of it returned. Rather than eliminating the use of monetary bail,
this plan reduces the "costs" of freedom and makes it obtainable
for an increased number of defendants. Yet, for the defendant who
cannot afford even the minimum deposit and is without public
credit or friends with money, release is just as remote as if bail were
set at five thousand dollars. The plan is a meritorious movement
toward a general reduction in the burdens imposed by the present
arbitrary bail schedules, but fails to cope with the most difficult
case-the destitute defendant faced with bail.
46 Smith, supra note 42, at 4; in Cuyahoga County, Ohio the common pleas court
sponsored a similar bail project and during its first four months of operation 46% of
those interviewed were recommended for ROR. Al of those recommended were
released and they all returned for trial as ordered. BAIL & SUMrsONS: 1965, supra
note 26, at 8.
47 Id. at 5.
48 Goldberg, Equal Justice For the Poor, Too., N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1964, § 6
(Magazine), at 101.
49 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 88, § 110-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967). Suppose a defendant
charged with a misdemeanor had his bail set at $1,000. Under the Illinois 10%
deposit provision, the defendant could execute a bond for $1,000 and deposit $100
(10%) with the court. Compliance with the terms of the bond would result in a 90%
return of the deposit and the cost to the defendant of his pre-trial liberty would be
only $10. If a professional bondsman were employed, the defendant would have paid
$100 with no refund (assuming the premium and service charge were equal to 10%).
See generally Bowman, The Illinois Ten Per Cent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 It..
L.F. 35.
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Some attention has also been given to the implementation of
police release procedure. This program involves the issuance of
summons to the accused on minor criminal charges in lieu of arrest
and detention. Without arrest, there is no problem of pre-trial de-
tention or bail. The summons procedure frees patrolmen from
stationhouse duty, saves the community the cost of housing detained
defendants, permits a defendant to demonstrate his reliability by
appearing for the hearing, and provides an opportunity for the
accused to prepare his defense. 50 Most importantly, the economic
considerations which pervade our present pre-trial release system are
eliminated in favor of a form of personal recognizance.
The feasibility of these alternatives is shown by their adoption
by Congress in the Bail Reform Act of 1966. 51 Combining many of
the above alternatives, this reform measure provides for the release
prior to trial of all persons charged with non-capital offenses on
their own recognizance unless the district court determines that this
will not assure their appearance. If such "ROR." is not sufficient,
the judicial officer must still permit release, but may impose one or
more conditions: third party parole, travel restrictions, daytime re-
lease, ten percent deposit, bail or any other conditions deemed
necessary. For capital offenses and bail pending appeal, the same
provision for release exists unless (in the court's judgment) none of
the conditions will reasonably insure against flight or against threats
to society.52 As an added deterrent to flight, there is a provision for
the forfeiture of any security pledged and, where the crime charged
is a felony, the imposition of a five thousand dollar fine and/or five
years imprisonment; in the case of a misdemeanor, the maximum
misdemeanor fine and/or one year imprisonment.53 This system of
conditional ROR eliminates much of the arbitrariness of monetary
bail by requiring individualization, not only for those trustworthy
and reliable defendants but for defendants with a potential for flight
that can be negated. Alternatives are available to the federal courts
to formulate a combination which will assure the defendant's pres-
ence and at the same time maximize the individual's opportunities
for freedom.
50 BAlL & SUMMONs: 1965, supra note 26 at XV. See, M. FRxEDLAND, Dam-no.
BEFORE TRIAL 9-44 (1965) for the operations of summons procedure in Canada.
51 18 U.S.C.A. § 3146 (Supp. 1967). See generally, Congress Reformed Federal Bail
Procedures in 1966, CRIME & JusTicE IN A.mERcA 46 (Cong. Quarterly Service, 1967).
53 18 U.S.C.A. § 3150 (Supp. 1967).
52 18 U.S.C.A. § 3148 (Supp. 1967).
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F. Constitutional Issues
These reforms serve to show that there are less discriminatory
alternatives to the prevailing bail system. Except for these small
pockets of reform, the present procedures continue to "distort the
purpose of bail, exaggerate the influence of professional bondsmen,
and effect purposeless and unconstitutional discrimination against
the poor." 54 Reform has not been so widespread that it moots pos-
sible constitutional issues. Given the problems of the many defen-
dants who cannot secure bail in any amount, the extremely high
expenses which accompany the implementation of the system, the
prejudice resulting to the detained defendant, the misuse of the
system by those empowered to implement it, and the availability of
reasonable effective alternatives, the current system of bail may not
meet the demands of the Constitution. At least one authority would
suggest that a constitutional crisis in the field of bail is threatening."5
1. Eighth Amendment
Bail is mentioned specifically in the eighth amendment of the
Constitution but is modified by the adjective "excessive." 60 The
Court in Stack v. Boyle, speaking through Chief Justice Vinson, ex-
pressed a test to determine what is constitutionally excessive.57 In
that case twelve petitioners had been arrested on charges of con-
spiring to violate the Smith Act, 8 and their bail had been set at
varying levels from $2,000 to $100,000. This was later modified to a
uniform amount of $50,000 for each defendant. Claiming that this
was "excessive" under the eighth amendment, the petitioners moved
for reduction. The only evidence presented by the government was
that four other persons convicted of the same charges had forfeited
bail in another district, but it was not shown that they were linked
in any way to the petitioners. On these facts the Court determined
that bail had not been properly fixed and stated:
If bail in an amount greater than that usually fixed for
serious charges of crimes is required in the case of any of the
petitioners, that is a matter to which evidence should be directed
54 Pannell v. United States, 820 F.2d 698, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Bazclon, c.j., con.
curring in part and dissenting in part).
55 Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 1, 113 U. PA. L. Rav. 959, 1125
(1965). This is a particularly exhaustive analysis of the entire bail area.
56 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VIII.
57 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951).
58 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2385 (1964).
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in a hearing so that the constitutional rights of each petitioner
may be preserved. In the absence of such a showing, we are of
the opinion that the fixing of bail before trial in these cases
cannot be squared with the statutory and constitutional stan-
dards for admission to bail.59
By stating that "bail in an amount greater than that usually fixed"
is excessive, the Court has confused what is usual with what is ade-
quate to assure the presence of the individual defendant. The wide
use of bail schedules supports the observation that the norm in many
jurisdictions is not an individualized amount. In fact, the use of a
schedule negates any concept of an individually tailored bail amount.
And further, the variance between the percentages of those defen-
dants who make bail in different jurisdictions makes it apparent that
the usual bail for any particular jurisdiction may be vastly different
from that of any other.60 The Stack test mocks the purpose and spirit
of bail by ignoring the effects of a test that sanctions an avoidance of
individualization and disregards what is required for adequate assur-
ance in a particular case. The continued application of this test is
intolerable. New content must be given to the bail clause of the
eighth amendment. The determination that a defendant is bailable
necessitates some manner of pre-trial release when alternatives exist
which can place release within the defendant's reach while assuring
his presence at trial. When determining whether the bail amount, if
set, would be excessive, the judge must determine the probability
that the defendant will appear at trial. Is the likelihood of flight so
minimal that there will be no need for monetary assurances? As has
been shown, a large percentage of the defendants in our criminal
system do not need bail set for them and for such defendants any
requirement of bail would constitute excessive surety. More than is
necessary is by definition "excessive."
This does not mean that all defendants must be released pend-
ing trial. Account has been taken of those instances where the
defendant might be so likely to flee that there is no other means
than high bail to assure against flight. The legislative distinction
between bailable and non-bailable offenses based on the fear of the
flight of the defendant is preserved. The language of the Court in
Carlson v. Landon may be of continued validity:
[The English bail dause does not] accord a right to bail in all
cases, but merely [provides] that bail shall not be excessive in
59 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951).
60 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When this clause was
carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that indi-
-cated a different concept.61
If the eighth amendment is to serve as the vehicle through
which the present bail system is to be reformed to protect the indi-
gent from unnecessary pre-trial detention, then the states must be
brought within its command. Although many cases have assumed
that the bail clause has been incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment and made directly applicable to the states,02 there has been no
Supreme Court decision specifically incorporating the eighth amend-
ment. In this light, an argument similar to that possible under the
eighth amendment may be evolved within the state systems under
their present law. Many states have constitutional provisions which
grant a right to bail in all cases except those capital cases where "the
proof is evident or the presumption great." 63 In theory this require-
ment of proof of guilt seems to require some clear evidence against
the defendant to override the presumption of innocence before bail
can be denied even in capital cases. In practice what constitutes the
quantum of proof necessary to deny bail varies considerably among
* the states.64 The courts are faced with the problem of balancing two
competing values: the presumption of the defendant's innocence
and his right to bail against the reluctance to release an accused who
is suspected of committing a heinous crime. But where the quantum
of proof is not sufficient to override the presumption of innocence
then even in capital cases the bail is excessive if it in effect denies
bail; for the state constitutional provisions speak in terms of "suffi-
cient sureties." Again, where the concern is for sufficient surety and
non-monetary alternatives are available, an indigent may have at
the least a state-created right to pre-trial release on the theory that
the amount of bail set is more than is sufficient.
61 342 U.S. 524, 545 & n.44 (1952).
62 Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965
(1964); Pilkinton v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir. 1963); Wansley v. Wilkerson,
263 F. Supp. 54,.56 (W.D. Va. 1967); People ex rel. Schildhaus v. Warden, 37 Misc. 2d
660, 672, 235 N.Y.S.2d 531, 546 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Contra, Comment, Equal Protection and
the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and its Progeny, 16 STAN. L. REV. 394, 411-412 & n.91
(1964).
63 OHIO CONsr. art I, § 9; see note 15 supra.
64 Comment, Determination of Accused's Right to Bail in Capital Cases, 7 Vii.
L. REv. 438, 444 (1962). Further, the nature of the capital offense varies from murder,
rape and even to robbery, e.g., ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 415 (1958) (Robbery).
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2. Due Process
There is an appealing argument that when a defendant's bail is
set at a level which he cannot satisfy and there is no other plan
available within the jurisdiction for assuring against flight, then he
is deprived of the fundamental fairness guaranteed under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5 The Court in Griffin
v. IllinoisO° wished to insure that the indigent not lose his freedom
as a result of an unjust conviction from which he could obtain no
effective review. Is denying effective review any more reprehensible
than denying the incarcerated accused the possibility of obtaining a
fair trial in the first instance? The Griffin rationale seems to be
directed at preserving the adversary system in order to maintain fair
trials and not at establishing some abstract prohibition against all
rich-poor distinctions. It would appear to be more efficient to secure
fairness at the trial stage rather than during the corrective proce-
dures of appeal. This fairness is best preserved when the defendant
can aid in preparing his defense. Furthermore, the pre-trial release
of the defendant alleviates the injustice of burdening a detained in-
dividual with the prejudices which accompany imprisonment. Also,
the evidence which suggests that defendants plead guilty in order to
avoid pre-conviction detention conflicts with any concept of due
process. "Although [the defendant] alleges he is not guilty, he is
denied fundamental fairness by being punished, imprisoned and
presumed guilty before he has been tried."0 7
Congress has made the determination that within the federal
system it is fundamentally wrong for there to be persons languishing
in jail prior to conviction when the sole cause of their remaining
there is poverty; the result of this determination was the Bail Re-
form Act of 1966.68 It is possible that the due process clause may
require the application of this same standard by the states in their
bail procedures. The Court has determined in recent cases that fed-
eral standards will determine the scope of the constitutional guaran-
65 Contra, Priest v. Department of Corrections ex rel. Nardini. 268 F. Supp. 242,
244 (D. Del. 1967) (being subjected to police questioning following a failure to meet
the required bail does not amount to an invidious discrimination nor a denial of
due process).
66 351 US. 12 (1956).
67 Meltsner, Pre-trial Detention, Bail Pending Appeal, and Jail Time Credit: The
Constitutional Problems and Some Suggested Remedies, 3 Cw. L. BuL.L. 618, 624
(1967).
68 18 U.S.C.A. § 3146 (Supp. 1967).
1968] 1019
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
tees under several of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Malloy v.
Hogan70 decided that the federal standard as espoused in Hoffman V.
United States71 for the protection of the personal right to remain
silent must be applied in state proceedings. Cannot a similar argu-
ment be made here? Within recent years the protection of the
fundamental right to personal freedom for the wealthy and the poor
alike has become possible in the federal courts without reliance on
financial surety. The states must not be permitted to ignore this
development.
3. Sixth Amendment
.If a defendant cannot aid in his own defense because he is
detained in jail for lack of bail money, he may be denied the effec-
tive assistance of counsel. He cannot seek or question witnesses who
may aid his defense. This may raise a sixth amendment-due process
question since it has been established that there is a constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel,, at least in all felony cases.1 2
It has recently been recognized that an unusual difficulty of contact
between the accused and his counsel may substantially interfere with
the right to effective counsel.73
Also of questionable validity is the practice of some states of
determining the right to have counsel appointed by the state by
reviewing who has been freed on bail.74 If the defendant posts bail,
he is not considered to need state aid for counsel. For the defendant
whose resources are sufficient for either bail or retained counsel but
not both, there is a choice between having state-appointed counsel
and remaining in jail, or of losing the right to state appointed coun-
sel and being free. Forced payment for one constitutional right with
the waiver of another cannot be condoned.
4. Equal Protection
The expansive language of Griffin and Douglas v. California6
has led many commentators to advocate that equal protection should
9 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US. 145 (1968).
70 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
71 541 US. 479, 486-87 (1951).
72 Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 572 U.S. 335
(1963).
73 United States v. Bitter, 374 F.2d 744, 750 (7th Cir.) (Schnackenberg, J., dis.
senting), rev'd, 389 US. 15 (1967).
74 Silverstein, supra note 27, at 645,
75 372 U.S. 353 (1963),
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be the avenue by which bail is attacked. 6 The argument is made
that the rich man goes free while the poor man is kept in jail with-
out a legitimate state interest to support this result. This analysis
applies a balancing test which weighs the various interests involved.
First, a permissible state goal must be found to support a discrim-
inatory classification; then there is an evaluation of the classification
scheme chosen by the state to determine whether it is "reasonable."
If less discriminatory methods are available for attaining the state's
goal, the method chosen is too broad and thus unreasonable. With
bail, the importance of freedom and the advantages it brings to an
accused at trial must be weighed against the interest of the govern-
ment in maintaining the integrity of its criminal system through
assurance that those who have been accused of a criminal act ap-
pear for trial. As indicated, with bail there can be no argument
by the state that the present program is necessitated due to the
economic expense of the alternative; it is the present system which
is so costly to the state. Less costly alternatives exist which protect
the same interest without unnecessarily depriving defendants of
their pre-trial freedom. The alternatives result in a substantially
reduced burden being placed on the accused and his family, which
should weigh heavily in any consideration on the merits of the
present and any proposed systems. Prima facie this would appear to
be a situation in which a violation of the broad equal protection
language of Griffin might be found. One of the most forthright
statements of this position was that of Justice Douglas in his much-
quoted opinion in Bandy v. United States.17 The action was a motion
to Justice Douglas for the reduction of the applicant's bail pending
certiorari. Justice Douglas denied the application for reasons unim-
portant here. Following the statement that "we have held an indi-
gent is denied equal protection of the law if he is denied an appeal
on equal terms with other defendants, solely because of his indi-
gence," Justice Douglas queried with reference to bail, "[c]an an
indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy man would not, be-
76 Foote, supra note 55, at 1180.
17 81 S. Ct. 197 (1960) (Douglas, J., sitting as a circuit judge). The decision has
been relied upon by many commentators as a guidepost foretelling the path which the
Court will follow in the area of bail. In a later petition from the same party Justice
Douglas continued, "Further reflection has led me to conclude that no man should
be denied release because of indigence. Instead, under our constitutional system, a
man is entitled to be released on 'personal recognizances where other relevant factors
make it reasonable to believe that he will comply with the orders of the Court."
Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1961).
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cause he does not happen to have enough property to pledge for
his freedom?"78
While the broad language of Griffin might conveniently lend
itself to a court's desire to reform the present bail system there is a
basic problem in relying on it. As an established rule of statutory
and constitutional construction the specific must prevail over the
general. Bail is specifically dealt with in the Constitution as part of
the eighth amendment. In Gideon v. Wainwright0 the Court chose
to rely on the specific language of the sixth amendment to establish
the right to counsel in state felony cases in preference to reasoning
through the general due process provision of the fourteenth amend-
ment. This would seem to be the proper approach for the Court to
take in the cases involving bail. There is no reason for the Court to
invite criticism that it is embarking on a war on poverty through the
use of the general and expansive language of the fourteenth amend-
ment when the same results can be obtained through the use of
other correctional doctrines.*
R. Lamont Kaiser
78 81 S. Ct. at 197-98.
79 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Justice Clark concurred in the result by relying on the
fourteenth amendment.
* The arguments and reasoning in this article relating to the present bail systcm
may be easily adapted to an attack on the use of fines and alternative sentences as a
means of criminal punishment. Judge Edgerton has stated in disscnt:
The nature of the penalty actually inflicted by a sentence of $25 or 10 days
depends on the dependent's financial ability and personal choice. If he chooses,
and is able, to pay the fine, he can avoid imprisonment. If he chooses im-
prisonment, he can avoid the fine. If he cannot pay the fine, he cannot
avoid imprisonment.
Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d 592, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Courts have begun to attack the unfettered use of fines and alternative sentences
in the situations where they are most oppressive and the forces of change are be-
ginning to stir for reform. See, e.g., People v. Tennyson, 19 N.Y.2d 578, 227 N.E.2d
876 (1967); People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686 (1966); ABA, Standards
Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, § 6.5 (Tent. Draft, 1967).
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